

Box _____

Folder # _____

Fon # _____

BEST COPY

AVAILABLE

Chrono

12 April 19

Director of Central Intelligence

Assistant Director for Reports and Relations

Liaison Channels [REDACTED]

25X1X7

REFERENCE: a. Memorandum of 14 February 1960 from AD/ODR to DDCI, subject as above

b. Memorandum of 20 March 1960 from AD/ODR to DDCI, subject as above

25X1X7
25X1X7

1. AD/ODR has been requested to comment on reference a. Briefly, reference a states that AD/ODR, AD/DR and AD/ODD agreed some months ago that no CIA intelligence or information should thereafter be sent to the [REDACTED] without advice to ODC and that no new categories of information should be given [REDACTED] without prior ODC concurrence. The aim of this agreement was stated to be "to prevent impairment of ODC's bargaining power". To reference a is attached a letter of 9 January 1960 from the [REDACTED] presenting the

25X1X7
25X1X7

opinion [REDACTED] that "any approach to the Central Intelligence Agency for intelligence should be direct from himself to Admiral Billingsley and that any material furnished in reply to his requests should come through [REDACTED] (*)." *

25X1X7
25X1X7

Further [REDACTED] suggested this arrangement on the basis for all correspondence of a policy or general nature between the two organizations and recommended that this channel be used for formal demands for intelligence. On the working level, however, he supports an extension of the method for exchange of views presently used between D/DR (CIA) and [REDACTED]

25X1X7
25X1X7
25X1X7

2. The stated purpose of the agreement among the AD/ODR, AD/DR and AD/ODD was "to prevent impairment of ODC's bargaining power". Reference b presents a strong case for the use of such an approach and advances a recommendation to abandon the long-standing practice of passing CIA intelligence directly [REDACTED] in favor of its formal dissemination [REDACTED] In support of this recommendation it must be conceded that retention of the present procedure would strengthen the position of [REDACTED] 25X1X7 [REDACTED] with possibly a related disadvantage to the [REDACTED] office.

25X1X7

SAC, WASH

25X1A6a

5. On the other hand it amounts of tail wagging the dog to stop
CIA-level exchange of top intelligence [REDACTED] 25X1X7
in order to enhance the prestige [REDACTED] of a sub-CIA office. Further,
such a change in procedure would constitute an affront [REDACTED] 25X1X7
which is certainly not desirable. And finally, it is believed that
the present Washington exchange system:
- a. Gives positive assurance that CIA high-level estimates
get to the right persons [REDACTED] 25X1X7
 - b. Permits us to ask in exchange for [REDACTED] papers which
are extremely important to CIA. 25X1X7
 - c. Facilitates close working level relations which, again,
CIA feels to be highly desirable.
 - d. Leaves OAS the bargaining lever of intelligence peculiar
to its functions and such material as RIS production, which it
distributes [REDACTED] 25X1X7 25X1X7
 - e. Impairment of OAS's position [REDACTED] can. It is felt, be
avoided simply by keeping OAS informed [REDACTED] 25X1X7
With this knowledge, OAS can approach [REDACTED] on the basis that
certain information on intelligence has been furnished them at a
stated time and place and that in return certain material would be
appreciated. OAS has only to advise of non-cooperation and pressure
can be exerted at CIA level. However, withholding of finished intelli-
gence in this manner would be a last-resort solution and one under
which CIA could stand to lose if [REDACTED] retaliated. 25X1X7
6. Therefore, it is recommended that:
- a. The long-standing Washington channel be continued for the
exchange of high level intelligence and correspondence of a policy
or general nature as favored by [REDACTED] 25X1X7
 - b. That OAS be kept informed of intelligence so furnished
[REDACTED]
 - c. That OAS use this information freely to stimulate a flow of
information and intelligence [REDACTED] 25X1A6a

25X1A6a

SECRET

25X1X7

d. That the nature of COM relations [REDACTED] should normally be confined to covert intelligence matters, but that no change be made in present use of COM channels for the transmission of materials such as the KIS series.

25X1X7

e. That CIA operates fully [REDACTED] as extension of working level agreements such as that now operating between DIA [REDACTED]

25X1X7

THEODORE SABOLY

25X1A9a

DIA - S/PP
[REDACTED]/PDT
6 Apr 60

Distribution:

Addressee - Original & 1
AD/OSO
AD/OCB
AD/OSI
AD/ORE - 2
S/PP - 2

SECRET